<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"><head><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml><o:OfficeDocumentSettings><o:AllowPNG/><o:PixelsPerInch>96</o:PixelsPerInch></o:OfficeDocumentSettings></xml><![endif]--></head><body>
Thanks for your detailed response. This group is fantastic.<div><br></div><div>Annette <br><br><br><div class="yahoo-signature"><a style="font-size:12px" href="https://apps.apple.com/us/app/aol-news-email-weather-video/id646100661">Sent from the all new AOL app for iOS</a><br></div><br><p class="yahoo-quoted-begin" style="font-size: 15px; color: rgb(132, 115, 255); padding-top: 15px; margin-top: 0px;">On Friday, December 13, 2024, 11:56 AM, Pamela Chestek via E-trademarks <e-trademarks@oppedahl-lists.com> wrote:</p><blockquote class="iosymail"><div id="yiv4282903720"><div>
<p>I don't see how it would prevent an application - what would be
the mechanism? But the same plaintiff can file an opposition and
would win if the elements of claim preclusion are met.</p>
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[*138] [**1297] Respondent Hargis Industries, Inc.
(Hargis), tried to register its trademark for SEALTITE
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
pursuant to the Lanham Act. Petitioner, <span></span><span style="border: 0px; font-weight: bold;" class="yiv4282903720SS_SH yiv4282903720SH_1780580861 yiv4282903720SS_prior yiv4282903720SS_tu1 yiv4282903720phrase">B</span><span></span>&<span></span><span style="border: 0px; font-weight: bold;" class="yiv4282903720SS_SH yiv4282903720SH_609661534 yiv4282903720SS_prior yiv4282903720SS_tu1">B Hardware</span><span></span>, Inc. (B&B), however,
opposed registration, claiming that SEALTITE is too
similar to B&B's own SEALTIGHT trademark. The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) concluded that
SEALTITE should not be registered because of the
likelihood of confusion. Hargis did not seek judicial
review of that decision.</p>
<p>Later, in an infringement suit before the District Court,
B&B argued that Hargis was precluded from contesting
the likelihood of confusion because of the TTAB's
decision. The District Court disagreed. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, holding that preclusion was unwarranted because
the TTAB and the court used different [***230] factors to
evaluate likelihood of confusion, the TTAB placed too much
emphasis on the appearance and sound of the two marks, and
Hargis bore the burden of persuasion before the TTAB while
B&B bore it before the District Court.</p>
<p><span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Held:</span> So long as the
other ordinary elements of issue preclusion [****2] are
met, when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are
materially the same as those before a district court,
issue preclusion should apply. Pp. 147-160, 191 L. Ed. 2d,
at 235-243.</p>
<p>(a) An agency decision can ground issue preclusion. The
Court's cases establish that when Congress authorizes
agencies to resolve disputes, \u201ccourts may take it as given
that Congress has legislated with the expectation that
[issue preclusion] will apply except when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.\u201d <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.</span> v. <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Solimino</span>, 501 U. S.
104, 108, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 115 L. Ed. 2d 96.
Constitutional avoidance does not compel a different
conclusion. Pp. 147-151, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 235-238.</p>
<p>(b) Neither the Lanham Act's text nor its structure
rebuts the \u201cpresumption\u201d in favor of giving preclusive
effect to TTAB decisions where the ordinary elements of
issue preclusion are met. <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Astoria</span>, 501 U. S., at 108, 111 S. Ct.
2166, 115 L. Ed. 2d 96. This case is unlike <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Astoria.</span> There, where
exhausting the administrative process was a prerequisite
to suit in court, giving preclusive effect to the agency's
determination in that very administrative process could
have rendered the judicial suit \u201cstrictly <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">pro forma</span>.\u201d <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it"> Id.,</span> [*139] at 111,
111 S. Ct. 2166, 115 L. Ed. 2d 96. By contrast,
registration involves a separate proceeding to decide
separate rights. Pp. 151-153, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 238-239.</p>
<p>(c) There is no categorical reason why registration
decisions can never meet the ordinary elements of
issue [****3] preclusion. That many registrations will
not satisfy those ordinary elements does not mean that
none will. Pp. 153-160, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 239-243.</p>
<p>(1) Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's conclusion, the same
likelihood-of-confusion standard applies to both
registration and infringement. The factors that the TTAB
and the Eighth Circuit use to assess likelihood of
confusion are not fundamentally different, and, more
important, the operative language of each statute is
essentially the same.</p>
<p>Hargis claims that the standards are different, noting
that the registration provision asks whether the marks
\u201cresemble\u201d each other, 15 U. S. C. §1052(d), while the
infringement provision is directed toward the \u201cuse in
commerce\u201d of the marks, §1114(1). That the TTAB and a
district court do not always consider the <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">same [**1298] usages</span>,
however, does not mean that the TTAB applies a <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">different standard</span> to
the usages it does consider. If a mark owner uses its mark
in materially the same ways as the usages included in its
registration application, then the TTAB is deciding the
same likelihood-of-confusion issue as a district court in
infringement litigation. For a similar reason, the Eighth
Circuit erred in holding that issue preclusion could not
apply because the TTAB relied [****4] too heavily on
\u201cappearance and sound.\u201d Pp. 154-158, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at
239-242.</p>
<p>(2) The fact that the TTAB and [***231] district courts
use different procedures suggests only that sometimes
issue preclusion might be inappropriate, not that it
always is. Here, there is no categorical \u201creason to doubt
the quality, extensiveness, or fairness,\u201d <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Montana v. United States,</span>
440 U. S. 147, 164, n. 11, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d
210, of the agency's procedures. In large part they are
exactly the same as in federal court. Also contrary to the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion, B&B, the party opposing
registration, not Hargis, bore the burden of persuasion
before the TTAB, just as it did in the infringement suit.
Pp. 158-159, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 242-243.</p>
<p>(3) Hargis is also wrong that the stakes for registration
are always too low for issue preclusion in later
infringement litigation. When registration is opposed,
there is good reason to think that both sides will take
the matter seriously. Congress' creation of an elaborate
registration scheme, with many important rights attached
and backed up by plenary review, confirms that
registration decisions can be weighty enough to ground
issue preclusion. Pp. 159-160, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 243.</p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0px;">716 F. 3d 1020, reversed and
remanded.</p>
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B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 138-139
(2015).
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<div style=""><span class="yiv4282903720SS_CRBHighlight"><span class="yiv4282903720SS_CRBHighlight"><span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated">Claim preclusion,
historically known as <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">res judicata</span>, prevents a party from
litigating a matter that should have been litigated in
an earlier proceeding. <span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCSection"><span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">See generally</span> 18 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402
(3d ed. 2018). Claim preclusion applies when three
elements are met: "(1) there is identity of parties
(or their privies); (2) there has been an earlier
final judgment on the merits of a claim; and (3) the
second claim is based on the same set of
transactional facts as the first." <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Nasalok Coating Corp.
v. Nylok Corp.</span>, 522 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (quoting <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems</span>,
223 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). </span></span></span></span><span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated"><span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCSection">When wielded against the defendant
from the first action, claim preclusion applies "only if
(1) the claim or defense asserted in the second action
was a compulsory counterclaim that the defendant failed
to assert in the first action, or (2) the claim or
defense represents what is essentially a collateral
attack on the first judgment." <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Id.</span> (citing <span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.</span>, 417
U.S. 467, 469 n.1, 94 S. Ct. 2504, 41 L. Ed. 2d 243
(1974)). </span></span><span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated">Claim preclusion can
apply against [**7] the defendant even if the first
judgment was a default judgment. <span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCSection"><span style="font-style:italic;" class="yiv4282903720SS_it">Id.</span> at 1329-30 (collecting cases). </span></span><span class="yiv4282903720SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated"></span></div>
<a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect" style="background-color:transparent;cursor:pointer;"><span id="yiv4282903720previewtextId" style=""><br clear="none">
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<a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect" style="background-color:transparent;cursor:pointer;"><span id="yiv4282903720previewtextId" style="">Maksimuk v. Connor Sport Court Int'l, LLC,
771 Fed. Appx. 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2019).</span></a>
<div class="yiv4282903720moz-signature">Pamela S. Chestek<br clear="none">
Chestek Legal<br clear="none">
PLEASE NOTE OUR NEW MAILING ADDRESS<br clear="none">
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El Dorado Hills, CA 95762<br clear="none">
+1 919-800-8033<br clear="none">
pamela@chesteklegal<br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect" target="_blank" href="http://www.chesteklegal.com" class="yiv4282903720moz-txt-link-abbreviated">www.chesteklegal.com</a><br clear="none">
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<div id="yiv4282903720yqt86579" class="yiv4282903720yqt9043458448"><div class="yiv4282903720moz-cite-prefix">On 12/12/2024 5:05 PM, Annette Heller
via E-trademarks wrote:<br clear="none">
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On a cruise so cannot do research but need an answer for a current
settlement case. Would appreciate any case cites if available,
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<div>Thanks. Annette Heller<br clear="none">
<div class="yiv4282903720yahoo-signature"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" shape="rect" style="font-size:12px;" target="_blank" href="https://apps.apple.com/us/app/aol-news-email-weather-video/id646100661">Sent from the all new AOL app for iOS</a><br clear="none">
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